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CASE NOTES
ADOPTION-STATUTE PROVIDING ADOPTING PARENTS BE
OF SAME RELIGION AS CHILD UPHELD
IN UNCONTESTED PROCEEDING
Petitioners, a Jewish husband and wife, sought to adopt a boy and girl,
twins, whose mother and "natural father" were Catholic. The twins were in
the custody of the petitioners from the time they were two weeks old until the
time of the adoption proceedings. There was no opposition to their petitions.
Evidence indicated that the petitioners were possessed of sufficient economic
means and had a good home, that they were fond of the twins and that they
gave them adequate care. The judge, after making his own findings of fact,
determined that it would not be "practicable" to decree adoption because this
would not be to the best interests of the children, so the petitions were dis-
missed. The basis for refusal was the Massachusetts statute which requires,
when practicable, that custody must be given only to persons of the same re-
ligious faith as that of the child.1 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
upheld the judge's action and thus precluded the petitioners from becoming
foster parents of the twins. Petitions of Goldmans, 121 N. E. 2d 843 (Mass.,
1954).
For purposes of discussing this case, it is perhaps only of historical and
parenthetical significance to briefly indicate that at Common Law adoption was
non-existent and that it exists only by virtue of statutes in the United States. 2
The Massachusetts statute, which was apparently the motivating factor for
denial of the petitions, reads as follows:
In making orders for adoption, the judge when practicable must give custody only to
persons of the same religious faith as that of the child. In the event that there is a dispute
as to the religion of said child, its religion shall be deemed to be that of its mother. If
the court, with due regard for the religion of the child, shall nevertheless grant the peti-
tion for adoption of a child proffered by a person or persons of a religious faith or per-
suasion other than that of the child, the court shall state the facts which impelled it to
make such a disposition and such statement shall be made part of the minutes of the
proceedings.3
This same court, two years previously, in Petition of Gaily4 involving similar,
but not identical circumstances, permitted adoption of a child born of a Catholic
mother, by a non-Catholic couple, reversing the lower court's denial of the
'Mass. L. Ann. (Supp., 1953) c. 210, § 5B.
Ashland v. Ashlock, 360 I11. 115, 195 N.E. 657 (1935). For an abbreviated history of
adoption, see 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children § 2 (1936).
'Mass. L. Ann. (Supp., 1953) c. 210, § 5B.
The Petition of Gaily, 329 Mass 143, 107 N.E. 2d 21 (1952).
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petition. There, also, the petition was uncontested and it was purely a matter of
judicial discretion as to whether or not the petition should be denied. The case,
which included a strong dissent, caused considerable comment, at least from
law review writers.' The same statute was under consideration, and the ma-
jority interpreted it to mean that while the religion of the child must have more
weight ascribed to it now, because of the statute, than it did previously in
adoption proceedings, the best interest of the child was still the prevailing
criterion in considering the suitability of prospective foster parents.
The dissent in Petition of Gaily argued that because the legislature saw fit to
enact such a statute, the religious element in determining the welfare of the
child now became of primal importance, and since the Massachusetts statute
was modeled after the New York statute,' it should be given the same judicial
construction as that given the New York enactment. The construction rendered
by the New York courts has been that the statute is a mandatory direction leav-
ing no room for judicial discretion.7 Thus the dissent argued that where the
petitioners adhere to a religious belief other than that of the child, permitting
the adoption would be the exception rather than the rule. Even without alluding
to the New York interpretation of the statute, this conclusion could easily be
inferred from a reading of the statute in its entirety.
The court in the instant case was unable to disregard the Gaily case; how-
ever, the sole distinguishing feature which the court found (or at least dis-
cussed) for justifying the Goldman decision was the fact that the Gaily case
came up entirely on documentary evidence and that the court was therefore in
as favorable a position as was the probate judge in making findings of fact. The
instant case was adjudicated by the trial judge largely upon oral evidence and
the elements which entered into the final decision were elements of fact and
embraced all relevant circumstances.
Apparently the court is referring to the fact that in the Gaily decision the sole
source of information relative to the suitability of the petitioners as foster
parents was a very favorable report by the department of public welfare to the
Probate Court concerning the health, education and economic status of the
petitioners and it mentioned, somewhat incidentally, that the petitioners were
of a different faith than the child. In the instant case, the judge made a thorough
investigation into all of the above factors, which were just as favorable to the
petitioners as they were in the Gally case; however, during hearings he further
found that there were many Catholic couples in and around Lynn, Massachu-
5 See, for example, 32 B.U.L. Rev. 448 (1952); 28 Ind. L.J. 401 (1953); '28 Notre Dame
Lawyer 29 (1953); 27 St. John's L. Rev. 141 (1952).
'N.Y. Domestic Relations Law (McKinney, 1941) § 113; N.Y. Social Welfare Law
(McKinney, 1941) § 373.
7 In re Santos, 278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 716 (1st Dep't, 1951). It should be
noted, however, that this is a case dealing with commitment of a child and is not one involving
adoption. Nevertheless, the statute controlling both aspects is the same. See also In re Adop-
tion of Anonymous, 195 Misc. 6, 88 N.Y.S. 2d 829 (Surr. Ct., 1949).
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setts, the place of adoption, enjoying equally- fine family- life, reputation and
material status who had filed applications with the Catholic Charities Bureau
for the purpose of adopting twins of the Catholic faith. There is no indication
in the Gaily case of an inquiry having been conducted to determine the possible
existence of alternative foster parents adhering to the same religious convic-
tions as the child.
Comparing the two cases then, it appears that the only time it becomes
mandatory for a court to deny the petition of one holding a religious belief
other than that of the child is when there are persons holding the same belief as
the child and in substantially the same position as the petitioners with respect
to other matters which the judge may consider essential in providing for the
best interest of the child. Also implied in this policy is the presumption that the
alternative foster parents would be willing to adopt the particular child in ques-
tion. Others may disagree with this conclusion, but objectively speaking this
appears to be the only purpose of the statute, because without it the judge in
determining the suitability of prospective foster parents would be guided by the
standard non-statutory principle of selection--to promote and preserve the
child's welfare.
Since the policy of the courts has always been to grant or deny petitions
pursuant to this principle, which included a consideration of the religion of the
foster parent and child, I the statute does nothing more than codify one element
in the concomitant of variables which a judge considers in determining whether
his action is for the best interest of the child. The statute then does not guaran-
tee, as does the New York statute, that in the adoption of any child "its re-
ligious faith shall be preserved and protected." 9
The constitutional validity of the Massachusetts statute was questioned in
the instant case on the grounds that it violated the provisions of the First
Amendment respecting an establishment of religion and prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.'0 The court dismissed this objection by pointing out that under
the statute all religions are treated alike; that there is no subordination of one
sect to another; that no burden is placed on anyone for the maintenance of
religion and no exercise of religion is required, prevented, or hampered.
The precedent cited by the court for this position was the Zorach case"
8 Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907).
9 The words in quotation marks are the words of the New York Social Welfare Law, op.
cit. supra note 6, subsection 4 which reads: "The provisions of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of this
section shall be so interpreted as to assure that in the care, protection, adoption, guardianship,
dicipline and control of any child, its religious faith shall be preserved and protected."
Massachusetts has no such counterpart in its act.
10 "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; . . ." U.S. Const. Amend 1.
a1 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). The New York Education Law permitted the
public schools to release students during school hours, on written request of their parents, so
that they may leave the school building and grounds to attend religious instruction or devo-
tional exercises. The United States Supreme Court ruled that this law did not prohibit the
"free exercise" of religion, nor was it a law "respecting the establishment of a religion."
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which softened the effects of the controversial McCollum decision 2 where the
United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution prevented the favoring
of any religion because of the wall of separation between the Church and
State. It appears that the court correctly disregarded the McCollum decision
because the statute makes no provision for impartial assistance in the promotion
of some project having primarily religious objectives sponsored jointly by re-
ligious and public representatives and using public funds or property as was the
situation in this particular case. For similar distinguishing reasons the scope of
the Zorach case was perhaps inappropriately applied because the statute makes
no provision for religious instruction of any kind. The statute, because it is
interpreted not to be a mandatory directive, merely provides for taking cog-
nizance of a child's faith in adoption proceedings. Even if the statute were con-
strued as mandatory, it would be a somewhat strained argument to hold that it
tends toward the establishment of religion because as the Massachusetts court
points out if the child has no religion, the statute does not apply. Conversely
where the child is established as having a religious belief, such faith would be
protected as to his particular case and the operation of the statute would not go
toward the fostering of any one particular religious belief over another.
Illinois, by statute, recognizes the importance of the religion of a child in
three different instances. The provision relating to adoption provides: "The
court in entering a decree of adoption shall, whenever possible, give custody
through adoption to a petitioner or petitioners of the same religious belief as
that of the child."'" The other two occasions when the religious belief of the
child is considered a significant factor is in the committing of neglected and
delinquent children14 and in the placing of children in homes. 15 There are no
Illinois decisions interpreting any of these provisions, which is somewhat sur-
prising, considering the fact that the one dealing with neglected and delinquent
children is over a half century old. The Illinois provisions all utilize the word
"shall" rather than "must" as do the New York and Massachusetts statutes.
Whether this difference is significant enough to disregard Massachusetts and
New York decisions in deciding whether the wording requires mandatory or
discretionary construction is a matter of conjecture.
12 McCullom v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
13 111. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 4, § 4-2.
14 111. Rev. Star. (1953) c. 23, § 211 provides: "The court in committing children shall
place them as far as practicable in the care and custody of some individual holding the same
religious belief as the parents of said child, or with some association which is controlled by
persons of like religious faith of the parents of the said child."
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 23, § 299 b (1) provides: "Whenever a child is placed in a family
home by a child welfare agency, such placement, shall, when practicable, be to, with or in the
custody of a person or persons of the same religious faith as that of the child. Whenever a
child is placed in a child welfare agency, such placement shall, when practicable, be to, with
or in the custody of a child welfare agency under the control of persons of the same religious
faith as that of the child."
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Generally speaking, other jurisdictions with similar enactments1" have ruled
that such statutes do not operate as legislative mandates, 17 and it may be that
Illinois would take this position contrary to the New York courts. Of course
neither Illinois nor Massachusetts has a provision similar to New York which
provides that a child's religious faith shall be preserved and protected. It is
difficult, however, to see why one is required."8
In conclusion, it appears that on the basis of the cases discussed herein, the
position of the majority of the courts is that although the religion of any child
will be recognized and considered, it will not be guaranteed or protected. More-
over, statutes relating to the religion of the child and foster parent create merely
one element given consideration in adoption proceedings. The logic of such a
position is questionable and inconsistent with any moral philosophy which
recognizes the importance of a child's religion. 9
16 For a comprehensive list of states with enactments in this particular area, see 54 Col. L.
Rev. 376 (1954).
17 See for example In re Butcher's Estate, 266 Pa. 479, 109 Atl. 683 (1920); In re Walsh's
Estate, 100 Cal. App. 2d 194, 223 P. 2d 322 (1950). For an editorial discussion of the matter
see 22 A.L.R. 2d 696 (1952) and 23 A.L.R. 2d 701 (1952).
18 The Petition of Gaily, 329 Mass. 43, 107 N.E. 2d 21, 29 (1952). This is the argument
of Judge Ronan in his dissenting opinion.
19 It is interesting to note that a proceeding on application for an extension of time to file
for a writ of certiorari was denied by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 75 S. Ct. 257 (1954). In the
opinion he stated: "Feeling as strongly as I do that compassionate consideration for the feel-
ings and interests of the various parties involved in this litigation calls for its earliest disposi-
tion here, I deem it important that steps be taken to have the petition before the Court as soon
as may be, with due regard to the Commonwealth's right to respond." However, when the
petition did come before the Court, certiorari was unanimously denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955).
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-BANK FOUND GUILTY
OF UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Defendant bank, authorized under the National Banking Act' to act gen-
erally in a fiduciary capacity as to estates and trusts, had two full-time em-
ployees who were licensed attorneys. These attorney-employees looked after
all trust and estate matters and prepared and submitted all orders, petitions, and
other instruments necessary in the probate and chancery courts. Suit was
brought by the Arkansas Bar Association to enjoin the bank from engaging in
the unauthorized practice of law. The supreme court of the state held that the
bank's probating, through licensed attorneys, of estates and trusts in which it
was named executor, administrator, or other fiduciary, constituted unauthorized
practice of law and it affirmed and enlarged the injunction granted.' Arkansas
Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l. Bank, 273 S.W. 2d 408 (Ark., 1954).
1 38 Star. 261, 262, 265 (1916), 12 U.S.C.A. § 248 (1945).
The Chancery Court had rendered a decree in part favorable to the bank when it refused
to restrain the bank's probating a will in which it was executor, or its preparation and present-
